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The transactions that I wish to emphasize here, however, are exchanges
of the recurring kind. Although large numbers competition is frequently feasi-
ble at the initial award stage for recurring contracts of all kinds, idiosyncratic
transactions are ones for which the relationship between buyer and supplier is
quickly thereafter transformed into one of bilateral monopoly- on account of
the transaction-specic costs referred to above. (Williamson, 1979, p.241).
1 Introduction
The citizens of Rome have requested a referendum to open up to competitive
tendering the provision of local transport services. This is, in microcosm, part
of a movement which has seen numerous countries and municipalities world-
wide progressively introducing competitive tendering for public services, such
as rail and bus transport, refuse collection, waste management, school meals.1
Yet, competition for the market is not always leading to market contestabil-
ity (European Commission, 2016). Incumbentspositions remain dominant,
with a few large players often winning contracts repeatedly within and across
sectors. With about 12% of GDP spent by OECD countries on public pro-
curement (OECD, 2017), and recurrent tendering characterizing the award of
many public contracts, maintaining e¤ective competition in the procurement
of public services is becoming a key issue.
We address two questions in relation to organizing the market for com-
petition. The rst concerns the initial condition. As historical operators
typically benet from sunk cost and information advantages vis-à-vis poten-
tial competitors, market design should take measures to ensure a level playing
eld. Breaking up the historical operator may contribute to achieving this.
The second question concerns the evolution of competition over time,
given that the service will be required for the foreseeable future. Having
sunk the entry cost, the winner(s) of the initial competition may obtain an
advantage in subsequent tenders. The timing of these tenders thus needs to
be carefully planned. Previous work suggests that, in the presence of scale
economies, lots should be awarded synchronously (see below). As we shall
see, incumbency advantages may alter this nding.
In fact, these two questions should not be treated in isolation. Our key
insight is that industry structure and tendering timing interplay signicantly
as instruments to ensure a competitive environment. Whether synchronous
1European Regulation 1370/2007 requires that, by 2019, public passenger transport
services (rail and road transport) are awarded to third parties solely by competitive ten-
dering.
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or staggered contracts should be used both a¤ects and depends on whether a
competitive market structure can result from an appropriate market design.
We consider an innitely repeated setting with two-period contracts for
two adjacent markets; they can therefore be tendered synchronously, in which
case both markets are tendered in the same period, or in a staggered manner,
in which case tenders alternate across the two markets. All rms face the
same cost of providing the service but, in order to operate in a market,
must sink a xed cost, which is lower if the rm is already operating in the
other market and zero if the rm is the incumbent. This is the source of
incumbency advantages. Any rm that loses a market must again sink the
xed cost in order to re-enter. There is a large number of potential entrants
and cost information is public knowledge. We focus on Markov equilibria
and compare per-period prices.
We show that one of two market structures may arise in equilibrium:
either one rm serves both markets (monopoly), or distinct rms operate
in the two markets (duopoly). Which market structure arises depends on
the initial market structure, the tendering regime, the discount factor and
the relative level of sunk costs. A duopoly always yields lower prices than
a monopoly, but it can be maintained only when the discount factor and/or
the incumbency advantage is low; monopolization prevails otherwise.
We derive the implications for the organization of competitive tendering,
by considering an extended setting in which a public authority, liberalizing
a number of markets, must choose whether to break up the incumbent, as
well as whether to auction-o¤ the markets on a city-by-city basis (so as
to have synchronous tenders within each city) or on a market-by-market
basis (so as to have staggered tenders within each city). Abstracting from
transaction costs, we nd that it is always optimal to break up the historical
operator, so as to start the tendering process with a duopoly rather than a
monopoly, and then use staggered or synchronous tendering, depending on
whether a duopoly can be sustained. The optimal timing depends on the
equilibrium outcome: staggered tendering is preferable when it maintains
a duopoly whilst synchronous tendering is preferable when monopolization
prevails. The key insight is that synchronous contracts facilitate competition
from potential entrants, and therefore should be used in case of a monopoly,
whilst staggered contracts facilitate competition among rms already active
in the markets, and therefore should be used in case of a duopoly.
These issues are very much alive. For example, French local buses are
normally tendered on a decentralized, and so staggered, basis. Amaral et al.
(2009) document the lack of competition in the sector. Over 60% of local bus
tenders in France between 2002 and 2005 received only one bid and the sector
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as a whole is dominated by three companies. When privatizing British Rail,
there was extensive (and acrimonious) discussion on how to organize the hor-
izontal split in passenger franchises in order to maximize competition. There
was also signicant discussion on the length of franchises, with the Treasury
arguing for three-year franchise awards in each case, all issued nearly simul-
taneously; eventually the franchises o¤ered were for longer periods, varying
between 5 and 15 years, with the most common being approximately 7 years,
so there was a natural staggering (Gourvish, 2002; Shaw, 2000). At the end
of the paper, we engage in a brief investigation of the London bus market,
considered an example of good practice in maintaining competition (Ama-
ral et al., 2009), and relate the policy trade-o¤s to the tendering procedures
followed there.
Private operators face similar issues. For example, National Express
coaches (NX), Britains largest inter-city and regional express coach oper-
ator with around 150 timetabled routes and hundreds of daily destinations,
contracts out almost all its routes to a large number of coach companies
(around 20).2 They need to buy coaches to NX specications and paint
them in NX livery. Hence, a new operator may need to spend money that
an incumbent does not. An operator on similar routes (e.g. in geographical
proximity) may have benets that an entrant does not. NX runs the website,
plans the routes, and sells tickets through it and through a variety of agents.
Prices are set on revenue management principles, but all money goes to NX
directly. Coach drivers, who must conform to particular standards, are able
to action spot sales, subject to conditions, but for the signicant majority
of passengers, they simply check tickets against a manifest when boarding
them.
More generally, rms face similar problems when they outsource services
such as maintenance, logistics or IT, and tender contracts recurrently. In-
cumbency advantage can there arise from the acquisition of knowledge on
the rms products and resource management system.
Related literature. This paper relates to a vast body of research on
how to increase competition in procurement when asymmetries among bid-
ders are present. Asymmetries are commonplace in procurement and may
arise from technology choices, locations of rms, capacity constraints, switch-
ing costs, better information and familiarity with local rules and regulations,
or from ownership of important assets. To maintain competition in such a
context, a number of papers have pointed out potential benets from using
discriminatory procurement rules (in a static setting, see Myerson, 1981 and
2Flixbus manages a similar network of bus routes in continental Europe.
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Maskin and Riley, 2000; in a dynamic setting see La¤ont and Tirole, 1988,
Lewis and Yildirim, 2002 and 2005; and Barbosa and Boyer, 2017), discount-
ing switching costs in the evaluation of bids (Cabral and Greenstein, 1990),
splitting supply (Anton and Yao, 1987 and 1992), using shorter and more
frequent contracts (Saini 2012), or enhancing the information on the com-
mon value components of potential entrants (De Silva et al. 2009).3 We are
more specically looking at the choice of the initial market structure and the
timing of tenders when the asymmetry arises from incumbency advantage.4
In the context of repeated interaction, the relative merits of staggered
and synchronous contracts have been left almost unexplored. One exception
is Cabral (2017), who compares staggered and synchronous contracts in an
industry with an innite sequence of short-lived buyers.5 The main point
of departure is that Cabral focuses on economies of scale, whereas we focus
on incumbency advantages arising from sunk costs. A rst implication of
economies of scale is that, with homogenous products, monopolization always
arises; as a result, synchronous tenders always yield lower prices. By contrast,
in our setting a duopoly can survive when incumbency advantages are not
too large, and staggered tenders are socially desirable in that case. A second
implication is that, in Cabrals setting, the initial market structure does not
matter, as incumbency plays no role; by contrast, in our setting it is desirable
to break up historical incumbents, so as to benet from a level playing eld.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
set-up. In Sections 3 and 4 we characterize the equilibria under staggered and
synchronous contracts. In Section 5 we derive the implications for market
design. In Section 6, we use our framework to discuss the case of London
Bus Tendering. In Section 7 we provide some concluding remarks and policy
implications.
3Empirical procurement studies present evidence in support of these predictions. See
e.g. De Silva et al. (2003, 2009) for evidence on the bidding behaviour of entrants; Athey
et al. (2013) on the impact of discriminatory procurement rules; De Silva (2005) and
De Silva et al. (2005) on the role of synergies across projects auctioned; Jofre-Bonet
and Pesendorfer (2000) on the e¤ect of capacity constraints; and Weiergraeber and Wolf
(2018) on incumbency advantage due to lower cost or better information in a common
value setting.
4This links our paper also to the literature on the endogenous determination of market
structure when property rights are auctioned (see, e.g., Dana and Spier 1994).
5The impact of the timing of contracts on competition has been studied also by Dana
and Fong (2011) and Iacobucci and Winter (2012), but their focus is on collusion or
exclusion.
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2 Setup
We consider two markets A and B that are repeatedly up for tender over an
innite horizon, discrete time setting indexed by t = 0; 1; :::. Specically, we
suppose that each market is tendered every other period, so that all contracts
cover two consecutive periods of operation, and compare two scenarios:
 synchronous tenders: both markets are tendered in even periods;
 staggered tenders: market A is tendered in even periods, whereas mar-
ket B is tendered in odd periods.
All rms face the same (total discounted) cost of providing the service for
two periods, which we normalize to zero.6 In addition, to service a market
a rm must sink a xed cost, which is however lower if the rm is already
operating in the other market. In each tender, there are therefore potentially
three types of rms:
 the rm currently operating in the market that is up for tender has
already sunk this cost;
 the rm operating in the other market (if it is not the same as the rst
one) needs to sink a xed cost s > 0;
 potential entrants need to sink a higher xed cost S > s.
We further assume that there is a large number of potential entrants, and
that any rm that loses a market will have to sink again the xed cost (s or
S, depending on whether the rm is operating in the other market).
In each tendering date, there are thus two states:
 StateM (monopoly): one rm, which we denote by M , currently ser-
vices both markets, and faces competition for the tender(s) only from
potential entrants, which we denote by E.
 StateD (duopoly): two distinct rms currently service the two markets,
and compete against each other as well as against potential entrants
for the tender(s). We will refer to the incumbentrm currently op-
erating in the market that is up for tender as I, and to the challenger
currently operating in the other market as C.
6In what follows, rmsprices can be interpreted as rmsmargins, net of operating
costs.
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In order to avoid coordination issues, we assume that the tender takes
the form of a combinatorial rst-price auction. With staggered tenders, each
rm simply submits a price for the market that is up for tender; the lowest
bidder then wins and services the market for the o¤ered price p. The resulting
prot for the winner is p if it already services the market (rm M in state
M, or rm I in state D), p  s if it does not but currently services the other
market (rm C in state D), and p  S if it is not currently operating in any
market (rm E).
With synchronous tenders, each rm instead submits a price for every
combination of markets, that is:
 a price P for both markets;
 and prices pA and pB for markets A and B.
The winning allocation minimizes the total price of servicing the two
markets, and each winner receives the o¤ered price for each market it obtains.
The prots are then computed as above.
Firms maximize the sum of their discounted prots, using the same dis-
count factor  2 (0; 1). We study the subgame-perfect equilibria and, to
eliminate any scope for tacit collusion, focus on Markov equilibria, in which
rmsequilibrium strategies in a given period can only depend on the cur-
rent state,M or D. In state D, under synchronous tenders, we further focus
on symmetric equilibria, in which both incumbents adopt the same strategy.
Finally, to discard dominated equilibria, we restrict attention to Coalition-
Proof Nash equilibria.7 In our setting, this amounts to a focus on equilibria
such that, in each period, the equilibrium strategies form a Pareto-e¢ cient
Nash equilibrium given the equilibrium continuation values associated with
statesM and D. In case of staggered tenders, this rules out losing bids that
are lower than rmsvalues; in case of synchronous tenders, this amounts
to focus on the most protable equilibrium. In what follows, equilibrium
thus stands for (symmetric) coalition-proof Markow subgame-perfect equi-
librium.
We rst characterize below the equilibria for both staggered and synchro-
nous tenders. We then derive the implications for market design.8
7See Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987).
8For the sake of exposition, we assume that the two markets are already serviced in
period 0, so that the game already starts in state M or D. This is consistent with
our market design analysis, which considers the transition from in-house to competitive
tendering.
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3 Staggered tenders
We rst consider the case of staggered tenders. Obviously, competition among
entrants implies that they obtain zero equilibrium prot. By contrast, incum-
bent rms may obtain positive prots. Furthermore, intuitively, an incum-
bent rm is better o¤ when it monopolizes the market than when a di¤erent
rm is operating in the other market.
Hence, letting Vi denote the equilibrium continuation value of rm i =
M; I; C at the beginning of each period, we expect:
VM > VI + VC (> 0) :
Building on this insight, in stateM,M prevails over E: it has lower costs
(it does not have to incur the entry cost S) and greater long-term benets
from winning, as Ms gain from remaining a monopolist,  (VM   VI),9 ex-
ceeds Es gain from becoming a duopolist, VC . M thus wins by matching
the best price that entrants are willing to o¤er, namely:
pE = S   VC ;
which corresponds to their cost of entering the market, minus the discounted
value of becoming a challenger in the next tender. We thus have:
VM = pE + VM = S +  (VM   VC) : (1)
Likewise, in state D we expect I to prevail over E: the long-term benet
from winning is the same for both rms (it is equal to VC), but I does not
have to incur the entry cost S. By contrast, the comparison between I and
C is less clear-cut: rm C must sink cost s, but derives greater long-term
benets from winning, as this enables it to monopolize the market Cs
expected gain from monopolization is again given by  (VM   VI), and thus
exceeds Is gain from winning and maintaining a duopoly, VC .
It follows that, depending on which rm wins in state D, two types of
equilibrium can arise:
 Single-state equilibrium: if s <  (VM   VI   VC), then C wins and mo-
nopolizes the market; the equilibrium then remains in stateM forever.
9If M wins, it remains a monopolist and obtains VM in the next tender; if instead it
loses, the entrant becomes a challenger, and M obtains VI in the next tender.
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 Dual-state equilibrium: if instead s >  (VM   VI   VC), then I wins
and two rms thus remain active. The equilibrium path remains forever
on the initial state: starting from state M, M keeps servicing both
markets forever; starting instead from state D, two rms remain active,
each one servicing the same market forever.
Consider rst the case where C wins:
 (VM   VI   VC) > s: (2)
I thus exits the market and obtains VI = 0, whereas C pays the best price
that I is willing to o¤er, namely:
pI =  VC ;
reecting the discounted value of being a challenger in the next tender. We
thus have:
VC = pI   s+ VM =  s+  (VM   VC) : (3)
Combining (1) and (3) yields VM   VC = S + s; using VI = 0, (2) thus
amounts to  (S + s) > s. That is, for a single-state equilibrium to arise, the
gains from monopolization should be large enough, which is the case when
entrants face greater cost disadvantage (S high) and rms pay su¢ cient
attention to future prots ( high). In addition, the cost handicap of the
challenger, s, should not exceed the gain from monopolization; although this
gain also increases with s, this indirect e¤ect is discounted by , and so a
single-state equilibrium is more likely to arise when s is small.
If instead
 (VM   VI   VC) < s; (4)
then I wins against C in state D (the roles of I and C are then swapped in
the next tender); hence, C obtains
VC = VI ; (5)
whereas I pays the best price that C is willing to o¤er, namely:
pC = s   (VM   VI) ;
reecting the cost of entering the neighboring market and the discounted
value of becoming a monopolist. I thus obtains:
VI = pC + VC = s   (VM   VI   VC) : (6)
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Combining (1) with (5) and (6), it can be checked that (4) amounts
to  (S + s) < s. The equilibrium price then depends on the initial state:
starting from state M, the incumbent monopolizes the market forever and
the price is equal to pE = S   VC ; starting instead from state D, the
incumbent prevails in each tender and the equilibrium is equal to pC =
s   (VM   VI). Building on this leads to:
Proposition 1 (staggered tenders) Under staggered tendering, generically
there exists a unique Markov equilibrium, which can be of two types:
 Single-state equilibrium. If
s
S
< Stag ()  
1   ;
then, regardless of the state in period 0, from period 1 onwards the equi-
librium path stays in the monopoly state; one rm then keeps servicing
both markets, and the equilibrium price is
pStagM  (1  ) [(1 + )S + s] :
 Dual-state equilibrium. If instead
s
S
> Stag () ;
then the equilibrium path remains in the initial state:
 starting from the monopoly state in period 0, the same rm ser-
vices both markets forever and the equilibrium price is
pStagM 
1  
1  2
 
1     2S   2s ;
 starting instead from the duopoly state in period 0, the same rms
service their respective markets forever and the equilibrium price
is
pStagD 
1  2
1  2 [(1  ) s  S] :
 In the limit case where s=S = Stag (), there are innitely many equi-
libria, which yield the same prices and prots and di¤er only in the
probability of moving from state D to stateM.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that the monopoly price pStagM varies continuously with s, S and , as
the expressions given by the two previous propositions coincide in the limit
case even across the two regions:
(1  ) [(1 + )S + s]j
=
s=S
1+s=S
=
1  
1  2
 
1     2S   2s
=
s=S
1+s=S
= S:
4 Synchronous tenders
We now turn to the case of synchronous tenders, and focus on symmetric
equilibria in which, along the equilibrium path: in stateM, each rm o¤ers
a bundled price and a symmetric unbundled price for each market (obviously,
the incumbent and the entrants will o¤er di¤erent prices); in state D, both
incumbent rms adopt the same strategy, which stipulates a price for the
market that it currently services, a (possibly di¤erent) price for the other
market, and a bundled price for both markets.
As before, competition among entrants implies that they obtain zero
prot, whereas incumbent rms may obtain positive prots, all the more
so when the same rm operates in both markets. Hence, letting VM and VD
denote the equilibrium continuation values of an incumbent rm in statesM
and D, we have:
VM > 2VD  0:
Building on this insight, in stateM, M prevails over the entrants. Fur-
thermore, the total price that two entrants are willing to o¤er for becoming
a duopolist, 2pE = 2S  2 (2VD), exceeds the bundle price that an entrant is
willing to o¤er for securing a monopoly position, PE = 2S   2VM .10 Hence,
in order to win M must match the entrantsbundle price:
PE = 2S   2VM :
M thus obtains:
VM = PE + 
2VM = 2S: (7)
10We stick here to the assumption that entrants must incur a sunk cost S for each
market. If entry benets from scale economies, the cost for entering both markets may be
lower than 2S (anywhere between S + s and 2S, say). In the Online Appendix we show
that, while this may slightly tilt the balance in favor of synchronous tenders, it does not
qualitatively a¤ect the insights.
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In state D, the two incumbents again constitute the relevant source of
competition. Hence, in equilibrium, either one incumbent wins both markets,
or each incumbent wins one market. We consider in turn these two types of
equilibrium.
Consider rst an equilibrium in which one incumbent wins both markets;
competition among the two incumbents then drives their prots down to zero
(VD = 0) and the equilibrium price is the best bundled price that they are
willing to o¤er, namely:
PD = s  2VM = s  22S:
We show in Appendix B that this equilibrium indeed always exists  in
particular, it is not protable for an incumbent rm to deviate so as to win
a single market.
Consider now an equilibrium in which each incumbent wins a market, at
some price p; obviously, they must then win the markets that they already
service.11 Furthermore, without loss of generality, we can assume P = 2p:
the bundle price cannot be lower than 2p (otherwise, one incumbent either
one would then win both markets), and any bundle price exceeding 2p is
irrelevant.12 But then, to ensure that incumbents do not nd it protable to
win both markets, the price p must satisfy:
p+ 2VD  2p  s+ 2VM :
It follows that the price p cannot exceed s  2 (VM   VD), and thus:
VD = p+ 
2VD  s  2 (VM   2VD) : (8)
Obviously, this equilibrium can exist only if VD  0, as rms would exit if
their total discounted values were negative; using (7) and (8), this amounts
to:13
s
S
 22: (9)
11Starting from a candidate equilibrium in which the incumbents would win each others
markets, deviating and targeting its own market would allow any incumbent to save the
entry cost s, and would therefore constitute a protable deviation.
12We assume here that the procurer can choose to unblundleand pay 2p when assign-
ing both markets to the same rm. In practice, some procurers actually require bundled
prices to be at most equal to the sum of the stand-alone prices (this is the case, for instance,
of Transport for London, the authority in charge of tendering London buses). However, we
show in Appendix B that the argument still applies if the rms can insist on higher prices
for the bundle.
13We have:
0  VD  s  
2VM
1  22 =
s  22S
1  22 ;
where the second inequality follows from (8) and the equality stems from (7).
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Intuitively, for each incumbent to win a market, the future gains from mo-
nopolization must not be too high: rms should therefore discount the future
substantially ( low) and monopolization should not be too protable (the
cost S of the entrants should not be too high); in addition, the cost of serving
the additional market, s, should be high enough.
Conversely, we show in Appendix B that this equilibrium indeed exists
under (9). Furthermore, VD > 0 whenever s=S > 2
2, in which case this
equilibrium is the unique coalition-proof equilibrium in state D, as the other
equilibrium (in which one incumbent wins both markets) yields zero contin-
uation value. This leads to:
Proposition 2 (synchronous tenders) Under synchronous tendering, there
exists a unique symmetric Coalition-Proof Markov equilibrium, characterized
as follows:
 Single-state equilibrium. If
s
S
< Sync ()  22;
then, regardless of the state in period 0, from period 1 onwards the
equilibrium path stays in the monopoly state: one rm keeps servicing
both markets, and the equilibrium price is
pSyncM 
 
1  2S:
 Dual-state equilibrium. If instead
s
S
 Sync () ;
then the equilibrium path remains in the initial state:
Starting from the monopoly state in period 0, the same rm ser-
vices both markets forever; the rm again obtains VM = 2S and
the equilibrium price remains equal to
pSyncM 
 
1  2S:
Starting instead from the duopoly state in period 0, the same rms
service their respective markets forever; they each obtain
VD =
s  22S
1  22 <
VM
2
;
and the equilibrium price is
pSyncD 
 
1  2 s  22S
1  22 :
Proof. See Appendix B.
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5 Market design
We rst compare equilibrium prices across tendering regimes and states of
competition. We then note that competition is more likely to obtain under
synchronous tendering, and draw the implications for market liberalization.
5.1 Price comparisons
The following proposition shows that equilibrium prices can be ranked:
Proposition 3 (price comparisons) We have:
pStagM > p
Sync
M > p
Sync
D > p
Stag
D :
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition relies on three observations:
 Monopoly prices are lower under synchronous tendering: pStagM > pSyncM .
Synchronous tendering decreases monopoly power by allowing the en-
trants to exert a greater competitive pressure. Winning both tenders enables
any entrant to replace immediately the incumbent monopolist, whereas un-
der staggered tendering, an entrant needs to win two subsequent tenders in
order to become a monopolist.
 Duopoly prices are lower under staggered tendering: pSyncD > pStagD .
Staggered tendering increases the competitive pressure that the other in-
cumbent exerts on the rm currently servicing the market. In both tendering
regimes, winning the other market enables an incumbent to become a monop-
olist: this is the case for C under staggered tendering, and for both incum-
bents under synchronous tendering. However, from the previous observation,
the benet from monopolization is greater under staggered tendering. Hence,
C bids more aggressively under staggered tendering than the incumbents do
under synchronous tendering.
 Prices are lower under duopoly: pStagM > pStagD and pSyncM > pSyncD .
14
In the monopoly state, entrants need to incur a large xed cost, S, in
order to challenge the incumbent. By contrast, in the duopoly state, the other
incumbent only needs to incur s < S, and thus exerts a greater competitive
competitive pressure.
5.2 On the sustainability of competition
The above analysis shows that, under both tendering regimes, competi-
tion may be sustainable, in which case it yields lower prices. Furthermore,
any competitive price under either tendering regime  is lower than any
monopoly price  in any regime. The following proposition shows further
that competition is easier to sustain under synchronous tendering:
Proposition 4 (sustainability of competition) The threshold for the ex-
istence of a dual-state equilibrium is lower under synchronous tendering:
Sync () > Stag ().
Proof. We have:
Stag ()  Sync () = 
1     2
2 =

1  

2 + (1  )2 > 0:
This is illustrated by Figure 1.
Under both tendering regimes, competition cannot be sustained when s=S
is too low and/or  is too high: when s=S > Stag (), a single-state equilib-
rium always arises, in which (at least from period 1 onwards) a rm monopo-
lizes the market forever. Conversely, competition can be sustained when s=S
is high enough and/or  is low enough: when s=S < Sync (), a dual-state
always arises in which, starting from the duopoly state, di¤erent rms ser-
vice the two markets. However, there exists a middle range (namely, when
Stag () > s=S > Sync ()), where competition can be sustained only under
synchronous tendering. The intuition follows from the rst two observations
above, which imply that the price increase stemming from monopolization
is lower under synchronous tendering (that is, pStagM   pStagD > pSyncM   pSyncD );
this, in turn, makes it easier to sustain a duopoly outcome, by reducing the
benet of switching to monopoly.14
14Recall that competition is sustainable when s   (VM   VI   VC) under staggered
tendering (from (4)), and when s  2 (VM   2VD) under synchronous tendering (using
VD  0 and (8)). In the former case, we have VM = pStagM = (1  ) and VC = VI =
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Outcome
Propositions 3 and 4 compare stationary equilibrium prices and do not
study the convergence towards these equilibrium paths. In the next subsec-
tion, we study how market design can a¤ect this convergence and determine
the equilibrium outcome.
5.3 Market liberalization
In practice, many services with natural monopoly features, such as urban
transportation or the local distribution of water, electricity and gas, have
traditionally been provided by regulated monopolies, before being opened
to competition in the form of competition for the market, rather than
competition in the market. Our analysis can shed some light on the design
pStagD =
 
1  2, and so
 (VM   VI   VC) = 
1  

pStagM   pStagD

:
Under synchronous tendering, we have instead VM = 2p
Sync
M =
 
1  2 and VD =
pSyncD =
 
1  2, and so
2 (VM   2VD) = 2
1 + 

1  

pSyncM   pSyncD

:
It follows that pStagM   pStagD > pSyncM   pSyncD implies  (VM   VI   VC) > 2 (VM   2VD).
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of the liberalization process.
For the sake of exposition, we consider a setting in which two pairsof
local markets, fAi  Bigi=1;2, are initially serviced by regulated monopolies
and to be liberalized; a pairof markets can, for example, be interpreted
as cities, and a market as a bus route.15 The liberalization may involve
privatizing the historical operator, and possibly breaking it up. To ensure
that the same number of markets are opened to competition in each period
under both synchronous and staggered tenders, we assume that liberalization
must take place progressively; specically, we assume that the regulator can
initially (in period 0, say) open only two markets to competition, and must
wait for the next period (period 1) before opening the other two markets to
competition. This can be justied, for example, by limited capacity within
the regulator.16
In this setting, the regulator faces two choices; it can:
 select which markets to open in period 0; the two relevant options are:
 opening one city to competition in period 0, and the other city in
period 1; in each city, both markets are then tendered synchro-
nously.
 in each city, opening one market to competition in period 0 and
the other market in period 1; tenders are then staggered in both
cities.
 decide whether to break up the historical operator:
 if it breaks up the historical operator into two independent rms
(assigning to each of them the necessary human and capital needed
to service a market), the rst tenders take place in a duopoly
state, in which two incumbents compete against each other as well
as against potential entrants (these may, for instance, comprise
historical operators from other cities);
 otherwise, the rst tenders take place in a monopoly state, in
which the historical operator only faces competition from potential
entrants.
15The reasoning readily extends to any number of cities and any number of market pairs
for each city, provided that there exists overall an even number of market pairs.
16An alternate approach would consist in initially tendering some of the markets for a
single period.
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The above analysis yields the following implications:
 When s=S < Sync (), there is no dual-state equilibrium in either ten-
dering regime; synchronous tenders then deliver the lowest (monopoly)
price.
 When instead Sync ()  s=S < Stag (), a dual-state equilibrium
arises only under synchronous tenders; synchronous tenders then again
deliver the lowest prices (regardless of which state they lead to).
 Finally, when s=S  Stag (), a dual-state equilibrium arises under
both tendering regimes; in this case, staggered tenders deliver the low-
est price if they lead to the duopoly state, otherwise synchronous ten-
ders still deliver lower prices (regardless of which state they lead to).
Hence, we have:
Corollary 1 (market design: long-term prices) When focussing on sta-
tionary equilibrium prices, breaking up the historical operators is strictly op-
timal if s=S  Sync (); in addition:17
 if s=S > Stag (), then prices are lower when, in period 0, one market
is opened to competition in each city (staggered tenders);
 if instead s=S < Stag (), then stationary prices are lower when, in pe-
riod 0, both markets are opened to competition in one city (synchronous
tenders).
Organizing the market prior to tendering by breaking up the incumbents
is weakly optimal, as it helps to ensure that a duopoly outcome will emerge
whenever it is feasible. By contrast, the optimal tendering regime depends
on market conditions. For high discount factors ( high), or when the incum-
bency advantage is particularly strong (s=S small), monopolization always
occurs; as in Cabral (2017), it is then preferable to opt for synchronous ten-
dering, so as to strengthen the pressure that entrants exert on the monopo-
list. When instead the discount factor is low or the incumbency advantage is
small ( low and/or s=S high), then in contrast to Cabral (2017) compe-
tition between two rms operating in the market can be sustained over time.
17In the limit case where s=S = Stag (), the optimal tendering regime depends on
which equilibrium arises under staggered tenders: synchronous tenders are optimal when
they lead to monopolization, whereas staggered tenders are optimal when the state remains
in duopoly forever.
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In this case, opting for staggered tendering is optimal, as it maximizes the
competitive pressure that incumbent rms exert on each other.
Corollary 1 is limited to the comparison of stationary prices, which arise
from t = 1 onwards. They are also the prices that emerge at t = 0 when
the initial state is a monopoly, or in case of a dual-state equilibrium. By
contrast, when starting from a duopoly in a single-state equilibrium, the
prices that emerge in the rst period are not the stationary prices: rms
instead compete aggressively for securing a monopoly position forever; as a
result, prices are very low, and even negative. Indeed, we show in Appendix
D that the rst-period prices are then given by:
pStagD (SSE) =  [(1  )s  S]  0;
pSyncD (SSE) =
s
2
  2S  0:
Therefore, it is important to consider how market design is a¤ected when
rst-period prices are explicitly taken into account.
We rst note that breaking up the incumbents is always strictly optimal.
In a dual-state equilibrium, this leads to lower stationary prices (from the
rst period onwards). In a single-state equilibrium (SSE), this generates a
tougher competition in the rst period: prices are then negative(meaning
that they are below cost, here normalized to zero), and thus lower than the
stationary monopoly prices that would otherwise emerge from the beginning.
In what follows, we thus suppose that the initial state is in a duopoly.
When the equilibrium remains in the same state forever under both ten-
dering regimes
 
s=S > Stag ()

, then we know from the previous comparison
of stationary prices that staggered tenders yield lower prices. When instead
monopolization arises under both tendering regimes
 
s=S < Sync ()

, it can
be checked that the rst-period price is lower under staggered tenders that
is, pStagD (SSE) < p
Sync
D (SSE). Yet, synchronous tenders deliver lower total
discounted prices, as they generate more intense competition that leads rms
to give up all prot.18
Consider now the intermediate range where monopolization occurs only
under staggered tenders, that is, Sync ()  s=S < Stag (). First-period
prices are again lower under staggered tenders (DSE refers to dual-state
equilibrium):
pStagD (SSE)  pSyncD (DSE) =  
s (1  )  23 + 1+ S2
1  22 < 0;
18That is, VD = 0. In addition, opting for synchronous tenders reduces total costs, by
postponing the occurence of the setup cost s for one of the cities.
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where the inequality holds due to condition (9). It follows that the desir-
ability of staggered tenders increases, relative to the previous comparison
based solely on stationary prices. Building on these insights, the following
Proposition characterizes the market design that minimizes total prices:
Proposition 5 (market design: overall prices) In the above setting, break-
ing up the historical operator minimizes the total discounted price. In addi-
tion, there exists a threshold ^ () 2 (Sync () ; Stag ()], which coincides
with Stag () for delta small and lies strictly below Stag () for delta large
enough, such that:
 if s=S > ^ () (which, by construction, includes the entire region where
s=S > Stag ()), then total discounted prices are lower when, in period
0, one market is open to competition in each city (staggered tenders);
 if s=S < ^ () (which, by construction, includes the entire region where
s=S < Sync ()), then total discounted prices are lower when, in period
0, both markets are opened to competition in one city (synchronous
tenders).
Proof. See Appendix D.
These insights are illustrated in Figure 2, where the solid line represents
the threshold ^ ().
The future rents that accrue to the monopolist under staggered tenders
induce more aggressive bidding in the rst period, which raises the benet
of staggered tendering. The e¤ect is greater when future prots are not
discounted heavily, which explains why ^ () may lie below Stag () for 
su¢ ciently high.19
Whenever monopolization is the ultimate outcome, intense competition
generates a windfall gain in the rst period. This may create an illusion
about the gain from liberalization, as well as distribution concerns across gen-
erations of users. In principle, this windfall gain could be invested or partly
saved to be redistributed over time; however, politicians and regulators may
be tempted to spend it at once, which raises issues about commitment and
19In principle, under staggered tendering the public authority could also choose to auc-
tion o¤ which market should be tendered rst. Whilst the public authority is indi¤erent
between starting with market A or market B, the rms are not indi¤erent: in the duopoly
state, if the equilibrium is a single-state one, then each incumbent rm would rather see
the other market being auctioned rst, so as to get an opportunity to monopolize both
markets. Hence, by auctioning-o¤ the choice of the initial market, the public authority
could extract all the rents, as the two broken-up incumbents are symmetric at that stage.
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Figure 2: Market Design
intertemporal fairness. Indeed, short-termism in politics provides incentives
to opt for a low price in the initial period, followed by price increases in
later periods, for example, through greater public contributions, or increased
fares.
We conclude this section by briey discussing the case where the market
structure cannot be adjusted at the time when liberalization is introduced. In
practice, closing down or restructuring the in-house provider may generate
substantial transaction costs, and redundancies may also have signicant
social costs. Because of these transaction and social costs, breaking up the
incumbent may be politically infeasible or even socially undesirable. In such
a case, it follows from the above analysis that monopoly remains the only
possible equilibrium state; synchronous tenders then always lead to lower
prices:
Remark 1 Absent the break up of the historical operators, prices are lower
when, in period 0, both markets are opened to competition in one city.
6 Tendering for London buses
The case of competitive tendering for bus services in London o¤ers interesting
stylized facts that appear consistent with our theoretical predictions. With
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over 600 routes, and over two billion passenger journeys annually, this is a
very large market. Aiming to facilitate competition for the market, the UK
Government chose in 1992 to break up and privatize the London historical
operator, creating 13 rms, each related to particular garaging facilities (see
Amaral et al., 2013, and Iossa and Waterson, 2017a). It then allowed the
rms to compete through a tendering process on a route-by-route basis. Since
2001, tender competition has been on a gross cost basis, fares going directly
to the organizer, Transport for London (TfL), with tenders being on the
basis of supplying buses, drivers, maintenance and garaging to match the
timetabling requirements of TfL for a period of ve (commonly extendable
to seven) years.20 Thus, we are able to examine outcomes where the same
route has been tendered twice.
Despite a number of acquisitions, entry and exit, to date the London
market appears to remain competitive. There are around 10 companies active
in the market, with ve having a share greater than 10%. This oligopolistic
framework relates to our duopolistic model. Over the years, on average
around three rms have bid for each route (see Table 1 below, and Amaral
et al., 2013), but in about half the cases, the contract is awarded the second
time around to the Incumbent operator and in a further quarter of cases it is
awarded to the same company with a di¤erent name, or a successor company
(see Table 2). This leaves around a quarter of cases where the contract
clearly changes hands, almost always to a Challenger in our terminology.
This is consistent with the incumbency advantage present in our setting.
To provide the service, rms must have depots or garages for stabling,
cleaning and maintenance purposes and these are rarely rented most are
owned by existing bus service operators. Our data reveals that in 47% of
cases, the contract is won by the company with a garage nearest to the route
and in a further 22% of cases, the winner is the second closest rm (see
Table 3). This suggests that the incumbency advantage is linked to garage
ownership.
It appears from Table 4 that the oligopolistic structure itself is stable,
although there is churn amongst operators and there have been entries and
exits from the London market. Interestingly though, the entrants of any
signicance have all purchased existing facilities from departing rms for
example when First group left the market in 2013, largely for exogenous
reasons, Transit Systems entered by buying up some of its garages and buses.
Ascertaining whether the market is moving towards monopolization is not
easy, as most of the contracts we observe (over the 2003 to 2015 period) have
20See Transport for London (2017); there is also a quality monitoring element, with
payments to or from the operator.
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been re-tendered only once on the same contracting terms, but the market
share data suggest any such movement is slow at most.
In addition to examining market structure, Iossa and Waterson (2017b)
have investigated how prices (per mile) are evolving over time and in par-
ticular whether prices the second time around are signicantly greater than
the previous tender for the same route, after allowing for input price in-
ation. Regressions show that, if prices are uprated only by the uprating
formula used by TfL, which allows 85% of labour and fuel costs to be passed
through, then there is some evidence of rising prices; however, on the basis
of uprating fully for ination in these items, there is no evidence that prices
are higher.
One possible explanation, consistent with our theory, is that garage re-
mains dispersed both in ownership and geography. The number of garages
su¢ ciently proximal to a route is such that several nearby active rms exert
competitive pressure on incumbents. As Table 5 shows, in 75% of tenders,
there are at least three operators who own a garage within 20 minutes driving
distance of the relevant route and rough estimates indicate that the resulting
cost penalty would be around 1%. This suggests a small di¤erence between S
and s in our setting, interpreting s as the handicap of the closest competitor
and S as the handicap of the next closest one; this, in turn, makes it more
likely for competition to survive.
Regarding tender timing, the evidence suggests a mix of synchronous and
staggered tenders. Each tranche of route tenders, issued every two to three
weeks on a rotating basis throughout the year, includes some nearby routes,
but the tranches are quite small, perhaps 6 routes, so that each covers only
a very small fraction of the total market. Bids for the whole tranche are
extremely rare, although package bids are quite common (sometimes, across
tranches).21 For the most part, we would argue that contracts are awarded
in a staggered manner.
Table 1: Number of Bidders
21Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2007) examine the issue of package bids in a structural
econometric model, focussing on cost synergies.
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Table 2: Winning Company
Table 3: Is the winner the rm whose garage is nearest?
Table 4: Market shares
Sources: Amaral et al.(2013) and
London bus routes.net/garages.htm(10/2015)
Table 5: Are other rms able to compete?
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7 Concluding remarks
We have studied the design of competition for the market in a setting where
incumbents (and, to a lesser extent, neighboring incumbents) benet from a
cost advantage. We have focused on two main instruments: market structure
and the timing of tenders, and shown that these are inherently interlinked.
Our ndings suggest that it is always optimal to break up the historical
operator, so as to start the tender process in a more competitive state. When
the discount factor is low and/or the incumbency advantage is small, this
su¢ ces to ensure that a competitive market structure will be maintained
over time, yielding lower stationary prices than monopolization.
The choice of the tendering timing should depend on the likelihood of
monopolization. When monopolization is expected, it is preferable to have
synchronous tendering so as to strengthen the pressure that entrants exer-
cise on the monopolist. When instead other rms remain active, staggered
tendering is preferable, as it maximizes the competitive pressure that comes
from the other rms.
Our framework can be further developed along several dimensions. One
important issue that we have left out of the analysis is the endogenous de-
termination of the number of contracts put up for tender  the so called
tranches or lots. The existing literature has typically considered con-
tracts that are tendered synchronously and highlighted the link between the
size and number of contracts, and the sustainability of competition over
time.22 It would be interesting to investigate how the number and size of
contracts a¤ects the trade-o¤ between cost synergies and competition when
tenders are staggered.
Another important issue worth investigating further relates to the e¤ect of
contract duration. Our analysis shows that the discount factor a¤ects both
the level of equilibrium prices and the threshold values characterizing the
equilibrium congurations. Further investigation could aim at disentangling
these two e¤ects. A further consideration is whether alternative time gaps
between tenders would be desirable, by creating asymmetries in the duration
of contracts put up for tenders over time.
We have used a stylized model with no uncertainty about cost conditions
or reliability, to better highlight the role that tendering timing and market
structure play in the presence of incumbency advantage. Recent episodes
in Europe, with large service operators going into liquidation whilst holding
hundreds of public sector contracts, suggest that having existing operators
ready to replace a failing contractor could yield signicant benets to con-
22See Grimm et al. (2006) for an informed discussion of this trade-o¤.
25
sumers, making it even more desirable to maintain competition over time.
Future research should consider introducing cost and reliability uncertainty
to explore how to best manage this type of termination risk.
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Appendix
A Staggered tenders: proof of Proposition 1
We characterize here the equilibrium of the game in which, in each period,
one market is up for tender. We rst characterize rmsbest o¤ers, and then
derive the implications for the equilibrium outcome.
A.1 Best o¤ers
A.1.1 Entrants
In both statesM and D, any potential entrant obtains:
vE =

p  S + VC if it wins at price p,
0 if it loses.
Potential entrants are thus willing to lower their prices down to:
pE = S   VC : (10)
A.1.2 Incumbent monopolist
In stateM, the incumbent monopolist, M , obtains:
vM =

p+ VM if it wins at price p,
VI if it loses.
It is thus willing to lower its price down to:
pM =   (VM   VI ) : (11)
A.1.3 Incumbent duopolists
In state D, the rm currently operating in the market that up for tender, I,
obtains:
vI =

p+ VC if it wins at price p,
0 if it loses.
It is thus willing to lower its price down to:
pI =  VC :
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The rm currently operating in the other market, C, obtains
vC =

p  s+ VM if it wins at price p,
VI if it loses.
It is thus willing to lower its price down to:
pC = s   (VM   VI) : (12)
It is useful to note that:
pI < pE; (13)
and:
pM < pC : (14)
A.2 Equilibrium congurations
We rst note that M always prevails in stateM:
Lemma 1 (M wins in state M) In stateM, M wins at price pE = S  
VC and obtains:
VM =
S   VC
1   : (15)
Proof. In stateM, E can win only when pE  pM , which, using (13) and
(14), yields:
pI < pE  pM < pC :
Therefore, in state D, I wins (as its best o¤er is the lowest, and thus it can
protably undercut any rival) at a price not exceeding pE (otherwise, any
entrant could protably undercut I); I thus obtains
VI  pE + VC  S;
whereas C obtains
VC = VI :
Furthermore, as M loses in stateM, VM = VI = VC ; but then, using (10)
and (11), the condition pE  pM amounts to:
S  VI  S;
a contradiction.
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Therefore, M wins in stateM. It cannot do so at a price exceeding pE,
otherwise any entrant could win and make a positive prot. Hence, M wins
at price pE.23
Next, we show that the incumbents constitute the relevant source of com-
petition in stateM:
Lemma 2 (incumbents are most e¤ective competitors in state D) In
state D, either I wins at price pC, or C wins at price pI .
Proof. As pI < pE, E can be a relevant source of competition in state D
only if pE  pC , which, using (10) and (12), amounts to:
 (VM   VI   VC)    (S   s) : (16)
I then wins at price pE and thus obtains
VI = pE + VC = S;
whereas C obtains
VC = VI = S:
In stateM, (15) yields:
VM =
S   VC
1   =
S   2S
1   = (1 + )S:
But then,
 (VM   VI   VC) = 0 >   (S   s) ;
contradicting (16). Therefore, in equilibrium, either I wins at price pC (if
pI  pC < pE), or C wins at price pI (if pC  pI < pE).
The only equilibrium congurations are thus the single-state and dual-
state equilibria described in the text, which we now consider in turn.
23As mentioned, we discard equilibria where losing rms o¤er prices lower than their
values (implying that they would make a loss if they were to win); for example, entrants
could o¤er less than pE , forcing M to o¤er a lower price as well. These equilibria are
neither trembling-hand perfect nor coalition-proof.
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A.3 Single-state equilibrium
In a single-state equilibrium, in state D, I loses the tender and thus obtains
VI = 0;
whereas C wins at pI and obtains
VC = pI   s+ VM =  (VM   VC)  s = VM   s
1 + 
:
Combining this condition with (15) yields the equilibrium values:
VC = S   (1  ) s = 0 and VM = (1 + )S + s:
For this to be an equilibrium, we must have pC  pI ,24 which amounts
to25 VC  VI = 0 and thus boils down to:
s
S
 Stag ()  
1   :
From period 1 onwards, stateM prevails; from Lemma 1, the equilibrium
price is then:
pM = S   VC = (1  ) [(1 + )S + s] :
A.4 Dual-state equilibrium
Consider now a dual-state equilibrium. In state D, I wins at pC and thus
obtains
VI = s   (VM   VI   VC) ;
whereas C obtains
VC = VI :
Combining these conditions with (15) yields:
VI =
(1  ) s  S
1  2 ;
VC = 
(1  ) s  S
1  2 ;
VM =
 
1     2S   2s
1  2 :
24Using (13) and (14), this implies that M indeed wins in stateM, as pM < pC  pI <
pE .
25By construction, C is indi¤erent between servicing the market at price pC or not
servicing it, in which case it obtains VI ; hence, winning at price pI gives C a continuation
value equal to VC = VI + pI   pC .
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For this to be an equilibrium, we must have pI  pC  pE, which, using
(10) and (12),26 The last condition amounts to:
 (VM   VI   VC)    (S   s), 
1  2   1;
which, together with  < 1, is equivalent to  < 1=2.27 The rst condition
amounts to VI  0,28 or:
(1  ) s  S
1  2  0;
which, together with  < 1=2, is equivalent to:
s
S
 
1   = 
Stag () :
The equilibrium path depends on the initial state:
 If the game starts in state M in period 0, then it remains in the
monopoly state forever; from Lemma 1, the price is then
pM = pE = S   VC = (1  )
 
1     2S   2s
1  2 :
 If instead the game starts in state D in period 0, then it remains in the
duopoly state; from Lemma 2, in each period the incumbent wins and
(using (12)) the price is :
pD = pC = s   (VM   VI) = 1  
2
1  2 [(1  ) s  S] :
Furthermore:
VI =
(1  ) s  S
1  2 ;
VC = 
(1  ) s  S
1  2 ;
VM =
 
1     2S   2s
1  2 :
26Using (14), the last inequality implies that M indeed wins in stateM, as pM < pC 
pE .
27If  > 1=2, the condition implies   2   1,   1.
28By construction, I is indi¤erent between servicing the market at price pI or leaving,
in which case it obtains 0; hence, winning at price pC gives I a continuation value equal
to VI = pC   pI .
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VM   VI   VC = pM   pD
1   =
S   s
1  2 > 0;
where the inequality stems from  < 1=2. Therefore, the monopoly outcome
features higher prices and industry prots.
A.5 Equilibrium multiplicity
When
s
S
= Stag () =

1   ;
in state D the incumbents are indi¤erent between winning both markets,
none of them, or keeping only their own market: they obtain zero prot
anyway; in particular, in particular, VI = VC in the single-state equilibrium,
and VD = 0 in the dual-state equilibrium. As a result, both types of equilibria
coexist and, more generally, for any  2 [0; 1], there exists an equilibrium in
which state D switches to state M with probability . However, all these
equilibria yield the same prices and prots. This is obvious for the monopoly
state, as prices then remain forever equal to the monopoly price, equal in
both equilibria to pM = S   VC = S. For the duopoly state, as just noted
all rms obtain zero prot anyway and, in both equilibria, the prices are also
zero: in the dual-state equilibrium, we have:
pDj s
S
=Stag() =
1  2
1  2 [(1  ) s  S]j sS= 1  = 0;
and, in the single-state equilibrium, where C wins by matching Is best price,
the equilibrium price is therefore pD = pI =  VC = 0.
A.6 Staggered tenders: recap
We can therefore distinguish two situations:
 If s=S < Stag (), then there exists a unique equilibrium, which is
a single-state equilibrium: regardless of the initial state in period 0,
from period 1 onwards a monopolist services both markets, and the
equilibrium price is:
psM  (1  ) [(1 + )S + s] :
 If instead s=S > Stag (), then there exists a unique equilibrium, which
is a dual-state equilibrium: the equilibrium path remains in the initial
state forever:
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 starting from state M in period 0, a monopolist services both
markets, and the equilibrium price is
pdM  (1  )
 
1     2S   2s
1  2 :
 starting instead from state D in period 0, a duopoly services the
two markets, and the equilibrium price is:
pdD 
1  2
1  2 [(1  ) s  S] < pM:
 For the limit case s=S = Stag (), both types of equilibrium exist and
we have:
psM = p
d
M = S; p
s
D = p
d
D = 0:
Therefore, the monopoly price (which is also the higher price, when both
states can arise in equilibrium) is a continuous function of s=S and .
B Synchronous tenders: proof of Proposition
2
We now study the equilibria of the game in which, in every even period, both
markets are up for tender. We start again by characterizing best o¤ers, and
derive the implications for the equilibrium outcomes.
B.1 Best o¤ers
B.1.1 Entrants
In both statesM and D, any potential entrant obtains:
vE =
8<:
P   2S + 2VM if it wins both markets at total price P ,
p  S + 2VD if it wins one (and only one) market at price p,
0 if it loses both markets.
Potential entrants are thus willing to o¤er:
 servicing both markets for a bundled price
PE = 2S   2VM ; (17)
 or servicing a single market for a stand-alone price
pE = S   2VD:
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B.1.2 Incumbent monopolist
In stateM, the incumbent monopolist, M , obtains:
vM =
8<:
P + 2VM if it wins both markets at total price P ,
p+ 2VD if it wins only one market at price p,
0 if it loses both markets.
It follows thatM would be willing to service both markets for a bundle price
PM = PE   2S < PE and to service a single market for a stand-alone price
pM = pE   S < pE.
It follows that M always nd it protable to win at least one market.
Furthermore, we have:
Lemma 3 (state M for synchronous tenders) Under synchronous ten-
dering, in stateM:
 if
2 (VM   2VD) >  S;
then in equilibriumM wins both markets at price P^E  min fPE; 2pEg;
the game then remains in stateM, and M obtains
VM = 2S + 
2 min f0; VM   2VDg 2 [S; 2S] :
 If instead
2 (VM   2VD) <  S;
then in equilibrium M wins a single market at price p^ = pE; the game
then switches to state D and M obtains
VM = S:
 Finally, if 2 (VM   2VD) =  s, both options can arise in equilibrium,
and VM = S.
Proof. If VM  2VD, then PE  2pE; it follows that:
 in order to win both markets, M must match PE, which yields
Vb = PE + 
2VM = 2S;
34
 in order to win a single market, M must o¤er a price p such that
p+ pE  PE, which yields
Vs = PE   pE + 2VD = S   2 (VM   2VD) :
If instead VM < 2VD, then PE > 2pE; it follows that:
 in order to win both markets, M must match 2pE, which yields Vb =
2pE + 
2VM = 2S + 
2 (VM   2VD) ;
 in order to win a single market, M must match pE, which yields
Vs = pE + 
2VD = S:
In the former case (VM  2VD), Vb   Vs = S + 2 (VM   2VD) > 0; in the
latter case (VM < 2VD), Vb   Vs = S + 2 (VM   2VD). Therefore:
 If
2 (VM   2VD) >  S;
then in equilibrium M wins both markets at price P^E; the game then
remains in stateM, and M obtains
VM = P^E + 
2VM
= 2S   2 max f0; 2VD   VMg
= 2S + 2 min f0; VM   2VDg ( 2S) :
It follows from 2 (VM   2VD) >  S that 2 min f0; VM   2VDg 2 [ S; 0],
and thus VM 2 [S; 2S].
 If instead
2 (VM   2VD) <  S;
which implies VM < 2VD and thus P^E = 2pE, then in equilibrium M
wins a single market at price p^ = pE; the game then switches to state
D and M obtains
VM = pE + 
2VD = S:
 Finally, if 2 (VM   2VD) =  S, both options can arise in equilibrium,
and VM = Vb = Vs = S.
Lemma 3 implies in particular that it is strictly protable to be a mo-
nopolist servicing both markets.
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B.1.3 Incumbent duopolists
In state D, each incumbent rm obtains:
vD =
8>><>>:
P   s+ 2VM if it wins both markets at total price P ,
p+ 2VD if it wins only its own market at price p,
p  s+ 2VD if it wins only the other market at price p,
0 if it loses both markets.
Each incumbent is thus willing to lower its prices down to:
PD = s  2VM ; (18)
p
D
=  2VD;
pD = s  2VD:
Noting that PD < PE and pD < pD < pE leads to:
Lemma 4 (state D for synchronous tenders) In equilibrium, either one
incumbent wins both markets, or each incumbent wins the market that it is
currently servicing.
Proof. We have: PE = PD + 2S   s > PD, pE = pD + S   s > pD and
pD = pD + s > pD.
We rst check that potential entrants cannot win any market. Suppose
rst that a potential entrant wins a single market, implying that at least
one incumbent must exit. The entrant must charge at least pE (otherwise, it
would make a loss, and thus protably opt out); but then, the exiting incum-
bent could protably outbid the entrant, as pE > max
n
pD; pD
o
. Likewise, if
a potential entrant wins both markets, then any incumbent could protably
outbid it.
It follows that either one incumbent wins both markets, or each incumbent
wins a single market. Furthermore, in the latter case, the incumbents must
win the markets that already service. Indeed, if the incumbents were to win
each others markets, then any of them could protably deviate by targeting
its own market instead, so as to save the entry cost s.
This lemma establishes that there are only two types of equilibrium out-
comes in state D. We show in the next two sections that, in both cases, M
wins both markets in stateM, implying that, again, the equilibrium is either
a single-state or a dual-state equilibrium.
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B.2 Single-state equilibrium
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which, in state D, one incumbent rm
wins both markets. If the total price is strictly lower than PD, then the
winner could protably deviate by opting out. If instead the total price P is
strictly higher than PD, then the losing incumbent could protably deviate by
o¤ering to service both markets at a price lying between PD and P (together
with prohibitively high stand-alone prices). Hence, the equilibrium total
price must be equal to PD, implying that both incumbents obtain VD = 0.
It follows from Lemma 3 that VM  S > 0 = 2VD and thus, in stateM,
M wins both markets at total price PE and obtains:
VM = 2S:
This establishes that the candidate equilibrium is a single-state equilib-
rium, in which the equilibrium path stays in the monopoly state from period
1 onwards, and that the outcome of these equilibria is unique, and (using
(17) and (18)) such that:
 in stateM, M wins both markets at per market price:
PE
2
= S   2VM
2
=
 
1  2S;
 in state D, one incumbent rm wins both markets at per market price:
PD
2
=
s  2VM
2
=
s
2
  2S:
To establish existence, consider the following equilibrium strategies:
 in stateM,M o¤ers a bundle price equal to PE = 2
 
1  2S, together
with stand-alone prices pE = S.
 in stateD, both incumbents o¤er a bundle price equal to PD = s 22S,
together with stand-alone prices pE = S.
In state M, M then wins both markets and obtains VM = 2S: the
auctioneer is indeed indi¤erent between allocating both markets to M or
to an entrant (and M could break that indi¤erence by o¤ering slightly less
than PE), and it prefers this to allocating the markets to di¤erent rms, as
PD = s  22S < PE = 2S   22S < 2pE = 2S. Furthermore, Lemma 3 and
VM > 2VD together ensure that M has no incentive to deviate.
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In state D, one incumbent then wins both markets, as pE = S < s=2  
2S = PD=2, and both incumbents obtain VD = 0. Furthermore, incumbents
cannot protably deviate: exiting yields the same zero value, and focusing
on a single market requires o¤ering a price ~p such that ~p + pE  PD; hence
the prot from such a deviation does not exceed (using ~p  PD   pE and
assuming that the incumbent targets its own market targeting the other
market would be even less protable):
~V = PD   pE + 2VD =
 
s  22S  S + 0 =   (S   s)  2S2 < 0:
Therefore, there always exists a Markov perfect equilibrium that is a
single-state equilibrium, and the outcome of such equilibria is unique; in
particular, from period 1 onwards, the per market equilibrium price is equal
to
PE
2
=
 
1  2S:
To determine whether this equilibrium is coalition-proof, we rst need to
study the possibility of alternative equilibria in which, in state D, the two
incumbents win their respective markets.
B.3 Dual-state equilibrium
Consider now a candidate equilibrium in which, in state D, each incumbent
rm wins the market that it already services. Letting p denote the equilibrium
price, each incumbent obtains:
p+ 2VD = p  pD:
The equilibrium prices p and P must satisfy the following conditions:
 Winning the market must be protable:
p  p
D
:
 The auctioneer must prefer splitting the market between the incum-
bents:
2p  min fP; PE; 2pEg : (19)
 No incumbent should nd it protable to deviate by outbidding the
other so as to win both markets:
p  p
D
 P   PD: (20)
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Condition (19) implies P  2p, which, combined with (20), implies
p  ~p  PD   pD = s+ 
2 (VD   VM) :
It follows that the equilibrium price p must satisfy
p
D
 p  min

~p;
PE
2
; pE

:
Conversely, any price p satisfying this condition, together with P = 2p,
satises all the above conditions and thus constitutes an equilibrium.
Such an equilibrium therefore exists if and only p
D
 min f~p; PE=2; pEg.
As pE > pD and ~p  pD implies PE=2 > pD,29 the relevant equilibrium
condition is
~p = PD   pD  pD () PD  2pD () 
2 (VM   2VD)  s:
Conversely, whenever such an equilibrium exists, the most protable of these
equilibria, which is thus a coalition-proof equilibrium,30 is such that the in-
cumbents charge min f~p; PE; 2pEg.
To study the existence of such an equilibrium, we note that:
~p >
PE
2
() 2 (VM   2VD) <  2 (S   s) ;
~p > pE () 2 (VM   2VD) <   (S   s) ;
PE
2
> pE () VM < 2VD:
Therefore:
 If 2 (VM   2VD)    (S   s), then pE  min f~p; PE=2g; incumbents
thus win their markets at price pE and obtain VD = S.
 If   (S   s) < 2 (VM   2VD)  s, then ~p < min fpE; PE=2g; in-
cumbents thus win their markets at price ~p and obtain VD = s  
2 (VM   2VD).
As the outcome of stateM depends on the comparison between 2 (2VD   VM)
and  S, we can therefore distinguish three congurations, depending on
where 2 (2VD   VM) lies, compared with the thresholds   (S   s) and  S.
We consider each case in turn.
29 ~p = PD   pD  pD amounts to PD  2pD; as PE > PD, this implies PE > 2pD.
30Recall that the alternative equilibrium, in which an incumbent wins both markets,
bring zero continuation values.
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B.3.1 Equilibrium conguration 1: 2 (VM   2VD)   S
From Lemma 3, in state M the monopolist obtains VM = S and, from
the above analysis, in state D each incumbent obtains VD = S. Hence,
2 (VM   2VD) =  2S >  S, a contradiction.
B.3.2 Equilibrium conguration 2:  S < 2 (VM   2VD)    (S   s)
As noted above, in state D, the two incumbents win their respective markets
at price pE and obtain VD = S. Furthermore:
 If in addition 2 (VM   2VD)   S, then, from Lemma 3, M obtains
VM = S in stateM, and thus 2 (VM   2VD) =  2S >  S, a contra-
diction.
 If instead  S < 2 (VM   2VD)    (S   s), then, in state M, M
obtains
VM = 2S + 
2 (VM   2VD) =
 
1  2 2S + 2VM = 2S:
We thus have:
2 (VM   2VD) = 0 >   (S   s) ;
a contradiction.
B.3.3 Equilibrium conguration 3:   (S   s) < 2 (VM   2VD)  s
In state D, each incumbent keeps its market at price ~p and obtains
VD = s  2 (VM   2VD) : (21)
In stateM,M obtains both markets at price P^E = min f2pE; PEg. It will
be useful to distinguish two cases, depending on the relevant option, PE or
2pE.
Case a:   (S   s) < 2 (VM   2VD) < 0 In that case, in state M, M
obtains both markets at price 2pE and obtains
VM = 2S + 
2 (VM   2VD) :
Combining this condition with (21) yields:
VM = 2
 
1  22S   2s
1  32 and VD =
 
1  2 s  22S
1  32 :
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The required conditions thus amount to:
  (S   s) < 2 (2VD   VM) < 0
  (S   s) < 2 (VM   2VD) = 2
 
2
 
1  22S   2s
1  32   2
 
1  2 s  22S
1  32
!
=   2
2
32   1 (S   s) < 0:
The last inequality requires 2 > 1=3; but then, the rst inequality amounts
to:
   32   1 <  22 () 2 > 1;
a contradiction.
Case b: 0  2 (VM   2VD)  s In that case, in stateM, M obtains both
markets at price PE and obtains
VM = 2S:
Condition (21) then yields:
VD = s  2 (2S   2VD) = s  2
2S
1  22 :
The required conditions thus amount to:
0  2 (VM   2VD) = 2

2S   2s  2
2S
1  22

=
22
1  22 (S   s)  s:
The rst condition requires 2 < 1=2, and the second condition then amounts
to:  
1  22 s  22 (S   s), s
S
 Sync () = 22:
Given that s < S, this condition implies 2 < 1=2. Therefore, if s=S 
Sync (), there exists a (symmetric) Markov perfect equilibrium in which:
(i) in state M, M wins both markets at price PE; and (ii) in state D, the
two incumbents keep their respective markets at price ~p and obtain
VD =
s  22S
1  22  0;
where the inequality is strict when s=S > Sync ().
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B.4 Equilibrium multiplicity
When
s
S
= Sync () = 22;
both types of equilibria coexist, but they yield again the same prices and
prots in both states. This is obvious in the monopoly state, as prices re-
main forever equal to the monopoly price, which is always the same in both
equilibria. In the duopoly state, both equilibria yield zero value: this is always
the case in the single-state equilibrium, and in the dual-state equilibrium we
have:
VDj s
S
=Sync() =
s  22S
1  22

s
S
=22
= 0:
It follows that both equilibrium prices are also zero: in the dual-state equi-
librium, the price is equal to:
pDj s
S
=Sync() =
 
1  2 VDj s
S
=Sync() = 0;
and in the single-state equilibrium, the equilibrium price is given by:
pD =
PD
2

s
S
=Sync()
=
s
2
  2S

s
S
=22
= 0:
B.5 Synchronous tenders: recap
Summing-up, we have:
 If s=S > Sync (), there exists a unique coalition-proof, symmetric
Markov perfect equilibrium which is a dual-state equilibrium:
 in stateM, M wins both markets at price PE and obtains VM =
2S;
 in state D, the two incumbents keep their respective markets at
price ~p and obtain
VD =
s  22S
1  22 > 0:
The equilibrium path depends on the initial state:
 starting from stateM in period 0, the equilibrium path remains
in the monopoly state and the per market equilibrium price is:
pM  PE
2
=
 
1  2S;
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 starting instead from state D in period 0, the equilibrium path
remains in the duopoly state and the equilibrium market price is
lower (as VM > 2VD) and equal to:
pD  ~p =
 
1  2 s  22S
1  22 :
 If instead s=S < Sync (), there exists a unique Markov perfect equilib-
rium which is a single-state equilibrium: regardless of the initial state,
from period 1 onwards the equilibrium path stays in the monopoly
state, and yields the same outcome as above, namely, M wins both
markets at price PE and obtains VM = 2S; the equilibrium per market
price is thus again equal to:
pM =
 
1  2S:
 Finally, in the limit case s=S = Sync (), both of the above equilibria
coexist, and yield the same prices and prots:
VM = 2S and VD = 0;
pM =
 
1  2S and pD = 0:
C Proof of Proposition 3
As already noted, pSyncM > p
Sync
D whenever a dual-state equilibrium exists un-
der synchronous tenders. We now check that the monopoly price is higher
under staggered tendering; noting that monopoly prices are continuous func-
tions of the parameters across the entire range, we have:
 If s=S  Sync (), then:
pStagM   pSyncM = (1  ) [(1 + )S + s] 
 
1  2S = (1  ) s > 0:
 If instead s=S  Sync (), then:
pStagM  pSyncM =
1  
1  2
 
1     2S   2s  1  2S = (1  ) 2 S   s
1  2 > 0:
 By contrast, duopoly prices are higher under synchronous tendering
whenever a dual-state equilibrium exists under both tendering regimes:
pSyncD   pStagD =
 
1  2 s  2S2
1  22  
1  2
1  2 [(1  ) s  S]
=
1 + (1  2)2
2
 
1  2  (S   s)
(1  2)  1  22 > 0;
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where the conclusion follows from the fact that, under staggered ten-
ders, a dual-state equilibrium exists only when Stag () = = (1  ) <
s=S < 1, which thus requires
 
2 <

 < 1=2.
D Market liberalization
We compare here the various liberalization scenarios:
 starting with a duopoly (break-up) versus a monopoly (no break-up)
 staggered versus synchronous tendering
In the process, it is moreover shown that the equilibrium prices are
uniquely dened, even in the limit case where both single-state and dual-
state equilibria exist. Furthermore, in that limit case, both equilibria are
equally protable, and thus are both coalition-proof.
D.1 Equilibrium prices
D.1.1 Staggered tenders
Dual-state equilibrium From Proposition 1, this is the unique equilib-
rium whenever
s
S
> Stag () =

1   :
As this equilibrium remains in the initial state forever, the equilibrium price
remains constant over time; from Proposition 1, depending on the equilib-
rium state it is given by (where the argument DSE refers to dual-state
equilibrium, and the subscriptM or D to the state):
pStagM (DSE) 
1  
1  2
 
1     2S   2s ;
pStagD (DSE) 
1  2
1  2 [(1  ) s  S] :
Single-state equilibrium From Proposition 1, this is the unique equilib-
rium whenever
s
S
< Stag () :
 Initial monopoly. If the equilibrium starts in the monopoly state, it remains
forever in that state and the price is thus constant; from Proposition 1, it is
equal to (where the argument SSE refers to single-state equilibrium):
pStagM (SSE)  (1  ) [(1 + )S + s] :
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 Initial duopoly
If the equilibrium starts in the duopoly state, it switches forever to the
monopoly state from the second tender onwards. Hence:
 From the second tender onwards, the price is, as above, equal to pStagM (SSE).
 In the rst tender, the price is lower, as I is a more e¤ective competitor
for C (remember that C is going to prevail, so as to switch to monopoly)
than the entrants are for the incumbent later on, in the monopoly
state. Specically, C wins by matching Is best price o¤ered, given by
pI =  VC , where VC is characterized by condition (3), that is:
VC = pI   s+ VM =  s+  (VM   VC) :
Combining this condition with condition (1) yields:
VM   VC = S + s;
and plugging this in the above expression of pI and VC leads to:
pStagD (SSE) = pI =  [(1  )s  S] :
As a single-state equilibrium exists only when s=S  Stag () = = (1  ),
it follows that the duopoly price is non-positive:
pStagD (SSE)  0:
It is therefore a fortiori lower than the monopoly price; indeed, we have:
pStagM (SSE) pStagD (SSE) = (1  ) [(1 + )S + s]  [s   (S + s)] = S > 0:
Equilibrium coexistence In the boundary case where s=S, both types of
equilibrium coexist, as well as many other equilibria, which however di¤er
only in the probability of switching from state D toM; from Proposition 1,
all these equilibria yield the same prices and prots in both states.
D.1.2 Synchronous tenders
Dual-state equilibrium From Proposition (2), this is the unique equilib-
rium whenever
s
S
> Sync () = 22:
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This equilibrium remains again in the initial state forever, and thus the equi-
librium price remains constant over time; from Proposition (2), depending
on the equilibrium state it is given by:
pSyncM (DSE) =
 
1  2S;
pSyncD (DSE) =
 
1  2 s  22S
1  22 :
Single-state equilibrium From Proposition (2), this is the unique equi-
librium whenever
s
S
< Sync () :
 Initial monopoly
If the equilibrium starts in the monopoly state, it remains forever in that
state and the price is thus constant; from Proposition (2), it has the same
value as in the dual-state equilibrium:
pSyncM (SSE) =
 
1  2S = pSyncM (DSE) :
 Initial duopoly
If the equilibrium starts in the duopoly state, it switches forever to the
monopoly state from the second tender onwards. Hence:
 From the second tender onwards, as above the price is equal to pSyncM (SSE) =
pSyncM (DSE).
 In the rst tender, the price is again lower thanks from tougher com-
petition among I and C:
From the rst condition on page 10, the bundle price is equal to:
PD = s  22S:
It follows that the per-market price is given by:
pSyncD (SSE) =
PD
2
=
s
2
  2S:
As this single-state equilibrium exists only when s=S  Sync () = 22,
it follows that the duopoly price is again non-positive:
pStagD (SSE)  0;
and thus lower than the monopoly price:
pSyncM (SSE)  pSyncD (SSE) =
 
1  2S   s
2
  2S

= S   s
2
> 0:
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Equilibrium coexistence As already noted, (coalition-proof) equilibrium
prices and payo¤s are uniquely dened. This is obvious when the (coalition-
proof) equilibrium itself is unique, which is generically the case, but it holds
as well in the particular cases where both equilibria (single-state and dual-
state) coexist, as they then yield the same prices and the same payo¤s to all
rms in all states.
D.2 Break-up decision
Taking as given the nature of the tendering process (staggered or synchro-
nous), it is always optimal to break up the incumbent, so as to start in the
duopoly state.
To see this, consider rst the generic case where the (coalition-proof)
equilibrium is unique. As duopoly prices are lower than monopoly ones (that
is, ptD (DSE) < p
t
M (DSE) for any t 2 fStag; Syncg), starting in the duopoly
state rather than the monopoly state always lowers the price that emerges
in the rst tender; furthermore, in the following tenders, this either has no
impact (in single-state equilibria) or it also lowers the prices forever (in dual-
state equilibria). It follows that breaking up the incumbent is optimal.
Consider now the limit case where both types of equilibrium coexist. If
the rst tender takes place in the monopoly state, the price remains forever
equal to the monopoly price  regardless of which equilibrium is selected.
If instead the rst tender takes place in the duopoly state, which yields a
lower price than under monopoly. In the subsequent tenders, the price is the
monopoly price (as in the previous scenario) if the single-state equilibrium is
selected, and the lower, duopoly price otherwise. Hence, regardless of which
equilibrium is selected, breaking up the incumbent yields a lower price in the
rst tender, and a weakly lower price afterwards.
D.3 Total bills
We now derive the total bill for the two cities when the incumbent has been
broken up. For each tendering regime, we consider both types of equilibria
in turn.
D.3.1 Staggered tenders
Under staggered tenders, each city runs one tender in every period. The total
bill per city is therefore of the form +1t=1 
t 1pStagt .
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Dual-state equilibrium
In a dual-state equilibrium, tenders take place in the duopoly state for-
ever. Hence, in each city the total bill is:
PStag (DSE)
2
=
1
1  p
Stag
D (DSE)
=
1
1  
1  2
1  2 [(1  ) s  S]
=
1 + 
1  2 [(1  ) s  S] :
Single-state equilibrium
In a single-state equilibrium, tenders take place in the duopoly state in
the rst period, and in the monopoly state forever afterwards. Hence, in each
city the total bill is:
PStag (SSE)
2
= pStagD (SSE) +

1  p
Stag
M (SSE)
=  [(1  )s  S] + 
1   (1  ) [(1 + )S + s]
=  (S + s) :
D.3.2 Synchronous tenders
Under synchronous tenders, each city runs two tenders every other period,
and one city starts in the rst period whereas the other starts one period later.
The total bill for the two cities is therefore of the form 2pSync1 + 2p
Sync
2 +
+1t=3 
t 12pSynct .
Dual-state equilibrium
In a dual-state equilibrium, all tenders take place in the duopoly state
forever. Hence, the total bill is such that:
PSync (DSE)
2
=
1
1  p
Sync
D (DSE)
=
1
1  
 
1  2 s  22S
1  22
= (1 + )
s  22S
1  22 :
48
D.3.3 Single-state equilibrium
In a single-state equilibrium, in each city the rst tender takes place in the
duopoly state, and all subsequent tenders take place in the monopoly state.
Hence, the total bill is such that:
PSync (SSE)
2
= (1 + ) pSyncD (SSE) +
2
1  p
Sync
M (SSE)
= (1 + )
s
2
  2S

+
2
1  
 
1  2S
= (1 + )
s
2
:
D.4 Tendering decision
D.4.1 Case 1: s=S > Stag ()
In this region, we have a dual-state equilibrium under both tendering regimes.
It follows that all tenders take place forever in the duopoly state. As duopoly
prices are lower under staggered tenders, it follows that staggered tenders
are preferable.
Indeed, we have:
PSync (DSE)
2
  P
Stag (DSE)
2
= (1 + )
s  22S
1  22  
1 + 
1  2 [(1  ) s  S]
=
 (1 + )
 
1  2 + 22
(1  2)  1  22 (S   s)
> 0;
where the inequality follows from the condition s=S > Stag () = = (1  ),
which implies
 
2 <

 < 1=2.
D.4.2 Case 2: s=S < Sync ()
In this region, we have a single-state equilibrium under both tendering regimes.
The comparison of the total bills shows that synchronous tenders are prefer-
able:
PStag (SSE)
2
  P
Sync (SSE)
2
=  (S + s)  (1 + ) s
2
= S   (1  ) s
2
> 0;
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where the inequality follows from the condition s=S < Sync ():
s
S
< Sync () = 22 < 2

1   :
D.4.3 Case 3: Sync () < s=S < Stag ()
In this region, we have a single-state equilibrium under staggered contracts
and a dual-state equilibrium under synchronous tenders. The comparison of
the total bills yields:
PSync (DSE)
2
  P
Stag (SSE)
2
= (1 + )
s  22S
1  22    (S + s)
=
 
1 + 23

s  (1 + 2) S
1  22 :
This expression is positive when s=S is large enough, namely, when
s
S
> ^ ()  1 + 2
1 + 23
;
and negative otherwise. The threshold ^ () lies above We have:
Sync () < ^ (), 22 < 1 + 2
1 + 23

, 2  1 + 23 < 1 + 2
, 44 < 1;
where the last inequality follows from 22 = Sync () < s=S  1. Further-
more, ^ () lies below Stag for delta large enough:
^ () < Stag (), 1 + 2
1 + 23
 <

1  
, 0 < (1 + 2) (1  )   1 + 23 =   1  2   22
,  <
p
3  1
2
' 0:37:
D.4.4 Recap
It follows that staggered contracts are preferred if s=S > min

Sync () ; ^ ()
	
(which, by construction, includes the entire region where s=S > Sync ()),
whereas synchronous tenders are preferred if s=S < min

Sync () ; ^ ()
	
(which includes the entire region where s=S < Stag (), as Sync () lies
below ^ () and Stag ()), as illustrated in Figure 2.
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Online Appendix
(Not for Publication)
We revisit here the case of synchronous tenders under the assumption
that entrants benet from scale economies: entering both markets requires
to sink S + s rather than 2S. We have:
Proposition 6 (synchronous tenders under scale economies for entry)
Under synchronous tendering, there exists a unique Coalition-Proof Nash
equilibrium, characterized as follows:
 Single-state equilibrium. If
s
S
< ^Sync ()  
2
1  2 ;
then, regardless of the state in period 0, from period 1 onwards the equi-
librium path stays in the monopoly state; one rm then keeps servicing
both markets, and the equilibrium price is
p^SyncM 
 
1  2 S + s
2
:
 Dual-state equilibrium. If instead
s
S
 ^Sync () ;
then the equilibrium path remains in the initial state:
Starting from the monopoly state in period 0, the same rm ser-
vices both markets forever; the rm obtains again VM = 2S and
the equilibrium price remains equal to
p^SyncM 
 
1  2 S + s
2
:
Starting instead from the duopoly state in period 0, the same rms
service their respective markets forever; they each obtain
V^D =
s  2 (S + s)
1  22 <
V^M
2
;
and the equilibrium price is
p^SyncD 
 
1  2 s  2 (S + s)
1  22 :
1
Proof. See Section A of this Online appendix.
Comparing these ndings with that of Proposition 2 shows that entry
scale economies make a dual-state equilibrium more likely to arise:
Sync () = 22 <
s
S
(< 1) =) 2 < 1
2
=) 
2
1  2 < 2
2
=) ^Sync () = 
2
1  2 <
s
S
:
This comparison also shows that, under synchronous tenders, entry scale
economies tend to lower equilibrium prices in the monopoly state, and in-
crease them instead in the duopoly state:
pSyncM   p^SyncM =
 
1  2S    1  2 S + s
2
=
 
1  2 S   s
2
> 0;
p^SyncD   pSyncD =
 
1  2 s  2 (S + s)
1  22  
 
1  2 s  22S
1  22 =
 
1  2 2 (S   s)
1  22 > 0:
The following proposition shows that equilibrium prices are nevertheless
ranked in the same order:
Proposition 7 (price comparison under scale economies for entry)
We have:
pStagM > p^
Sync
M > p^
Sync
D > p
Stag
D :
Proof. See Section B of this Online appendix.
With entry scale economies (S + s rather than 2S) under synchronous
tenders, the entrants exert more pressure on the incumbent in the monopoly
state, which tends to lower the monopoly price; indirectly, this reduces the
intensity of competition among the two incumbents in the duopoly state,
which tends to increase duopoly prices. Still, the four equilibrium prices
are still ranked as in the baseline model. Intuitively, entry scale economies
under synchronous tenders reinforce the result that psyncM < p
stag
M : As we have
discussed in Section 5, this, in turn, explains why psyncD < p
stag
D , and these
two inequalities again imply that the prot increase resulting from switching
to monopoly is reduced, making dual state more likely
A Proof of Proposition 6
We now study the equilibria of the game in which, in every even period, both
markets are up for tender. We start again by characterizing best o¤ers, and
derive the implications for the equilibrium outcomes.
2
A.1 Best o¤ers
A.1.1 Entrants
In both statesM and D, any potential entrant obtains:
vE =
8<:
P   S   s+ 2VM if it wins both markets at total price P ,
p  S + 2VD if it wins one (and only one) market at price p,
0 if it loses both markets.
Potential entrants are thus willing to o¤er:
 servicing both markets for a bundled price
PE = S + s  2VM ; (22)
 or servicing a single market for a stand-alone price
pE = S   2VD:
A.1.2 Incumbent monopolist
In stateM, the incumbent monopolist, M , obtains:
vM =
8<:
P + 2VM if it wins both markets at total price P ,
p+ 2VD if it wins one market at price p,
0 if it loses both markets.
It follows thatM would be willing to service both markets for a bundle price
PM = PE S  s < PE and to service a single market for a stand-alone price
pM = pE   S < pE.
It follows that M always nd it protable to win at least one market.
Furthermore, we have:
Lemma 5 (state M for synchronous tenders under scale economies for entry)
Under synchronous tendering, in stateM:
 if
2 (VM   2VD) >  S;
then in equilibrium M wins both markets at price
P^E  min fPE; 2pEg ;
the game then remains in stateM, and M obtains
VM = S + s+ min

0; S   s+ 2 (VM   2VD)
	 2 [S; S + s] :
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 If instead
2 (VM   2VD) <  S;
then in equilibrium M wins a single market at price p^ = pE; the game
then switches to state D and M obtains
VM = S:
 Finally, if 2 (VM   2VD) =  s, both options can arise in equilibrium,
and VM = S.
Proof. If VM  2VD   (S   s), then PE  2pE; it follows that:
 in order to win both markets, M must match PE, which yields
Vb = PE + 
2VM = S + s;
 in order to win a single market, M must o¤er a price p such that
p+ pE  PE, which yields
Vs = PE   pE + 2VD = s  2 (VM   2VD) :
If instead VM < 2VD   (S   s), then PE > 2pE; it follows that:
 in order to win both markets, M must match 2pE, which yieldsVb =
2pE + 
2VM = 2S + 
2 (VM   2VD) ;
 in order to win a single market, M must match pE, which yields
Vs = pE + 
2VD = S:
In the former case (VM  2VD  (S   s)), Vb Vs = S+ 2 (VM   2VD) 
s > 0; in the latter case (VM < 2VD), Vb Vs = S+2 (VM   2VD). Therefore:
 If
2 (VM   2VD) >  S;
then in equilibrium M wins both markets at price P^E; the game then
remains in stateM, and M obtains
VM = P^E + 
2VM
= min

S + s  2VM ; 2
 
S   2VD
	
+ 2VM
= S + s+ min

0; S   s+ 2 (VM   2VD)
	
( S + s) :
It follows from 2 (VM   2VD) >  S thatmin

0; 2 (VM   2VD) + S   s
	 2
[ s; 0], and thus VM 2 [S; S + s].
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 If instead
2 (VM   2VD) <  S;
which implies VM < 2VD  (S   s) and thus P^E = 2pE, then in equilib-
rium M wins a single market at price p^ = pE; the game then switches
to state D and M obtains
VM = pE + 
2VD = S:
 Finally, if 2 (VM   2VD) =  S, both options can arise in equilibrium,
and VM = Vb = Vs = S.
Lemma 5 implies in particular that it is strictly protable to be a mo-
nopolist servicing both markets.
A.1.3 Incumbent duopolists
In state D, each incumbent rm obtains:
vD =
8>><>>:
P   s+ 2VM if it wins both markets at total price P ,
p+ 2VD if it wins only its own market at price p,
p  s+ 2VD if it wins only the other market at price p,
0 if it loses both markets.
Each incumbent is thus willing to lower its prices down to:
PD = s  2VM ; (23)
p
D
=  2VD;
pD = s  2VD:
Noting that PD < PE and pD < pD < pE leads to:
Lemma 6 (state D for synchronous tenders under scale economies for entry)
In equilibrium, either one incumbent wins both markets, or each incumbent
wins the market that it is currently servicing.
Proof. We have: PE = PD + S > PD, pE = pD + S   s > pD and pD =
p
D
+ s > p
D
.
We rst check that potential entrants cannot win any market. Suppose
rst that a potential entrant wins a single market, implying that at least
5
one incumbent must exit. The entrant must charge at least pE (otherwise, it
would make a loss, and thus protably opt out); but then, the exiting incum-
bent could protably outbid the entrant, as pE > max
n
pD; pD
o
. Likewise, if
a potential entrant wins both markets, then any incumbent could protably
outbid it.
It follows that either one incumbent wins both markets, or each incumbent
wins a single market. Furthermore, in the latter case, the incumbents must
win the markets that already service. Indeed, if the incumbents were to win
each others markets, then any of them could protably deviate by targeting
its own market instead, so as to save the entry cost s.
This lemma establishes that there are only two types of equilibrium out-
comes in state D. We show in the next two sections that, in both cases, M
wins both markets in stateM, implying that, again, the equilibrium is either
a single-state or a dual-state equilibrium.
A.2 Single-state equilibrium
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which, in state D, one incumbent rm
wins both markets. If the total price is strictly lower than PD, then the
winner could protably deviate by opting out. If instead the total price P is
strictly higher than PD, then the losing incumbent could protably deviate by
o¤ering to service both markets at a price lying between PD and P (together
with prohibitively high stand-alone prices). Hence, the equilibrium total
price must be equal to PD, implying that both incumbents obtain VD = 0.
It follows from Lemma 5 that VM  S > 0 = 2VD and thus, in stateM,
M wins both markets at total price PE and obtains:
VM = S + s:
This establishes that the candidate equilibrium is a single-state equilib-
rium, in which the equilibrium path stays in the monopoly state from period
1 onwards, and that the outcome of these equilibria is unique, and (using
(22) and (23)) such that:
 in stateM, M wins both markets at per market price:
PE
2
=
S + s  2VM
2
=
 
1  2 S + s
2
;
 in state D, one incumbent rm wins both markets at per market price:
PD
2
=
s  2VM
2
=
s  2 (S + s)
2
:
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To establish existence, consider the following equilibrium strategies:
 in state M, M o¤ers a bundle price equal to PE =
 
1  2 (S + s),
together with stand-alone prices pE = S.
 in state D, both incumbents o¤er a bundle price equal to PD = s  
2 (S + s), together with stand-alone prices pE = S.
In state M, M then wins both markets and obtains VM = S + s: the
auctioneer is indeed indi¤erent between allocating both markets to M or
to an entrant (and M could break that indi¤erence by o¤ering slightly less
than PE), and it prefers this to allocating the markets to di¤erent rms, as
2pE = 2S >
 
1  2 (S + s) = PE. Furthermore, Lemma 5 and VM > 2VD
together ensure that M has no incentive to deviate.
In stateD, one incumbent then wins both markets, as PD = s 2 (S + s) <
PE =
 
1  2 (S + s) < 2pE = 2S, and both incumbents obtain VD = 0.
Furthermore, incumbents cannot protably deviate: exiting yields the same
zero value, and focusing on a single market requires o¤ering a price p such
that p + pE  PD; hence the prot from such a deviation does not exceed
(using p  PD pE and assuming that the incumbent targets its own market
targeting the other market would be even less protable):
V = PD   pE + 2VD = s  2 (S + s)  S =   (S   s)  2 (S + s) < 0:
Therefore, there always exists a Markov perfect equilibrium that is a
single-state equilibrium, and the outcome of such equilibria is unique; in
particular, from period 1 onwards, the per market equilibrium price is equal
to
PE
2
=
 
1  2 S + s
2
:
To determine whether this equilibrium is coalition-proof, we rst need to
study the possibility of alternative equilibria in which, in state D, the two
incumbents win their respective markets.
A.3 Dual-state equilibrium
Consider now a candidate equilibrium in which, in state D, each incumbent
rm wins the market that it already services. Letting p denote the equilibrium
price, each incumbent obtains:
p+ 2VD = p  pD:
The equilibrium prices p and P must satisfy the following conditions:
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 Winning the market must be protable:
p  p
D
:
 The auctioneer must prefer splitting the market between the incum-
bents:
2p  min fP; PE; 2pEg : (24)
 No incumbent should nd it protable to deviate by outbidding the
other so as to win both markets:
p  p
D
 P   PD: (25)
Condition (24) implies P  2p, which, combined with (25), implies
p  ~p  PD   pD = s+ 
2 (VD   VM) :
It follows that the equilibrium price p must satisfy
p
D
 p  min

~p;
PE
2
; pE

:
Conversely, any price p satisfying this condition, together with P = 2p,
satises all the above conditions and thus constitutes an equilibrium.
Such an equilibrium therefore exists if and only p
D
 min f~p; PE=2; pEg.
As pE > pD and ~p  pD implies PE=2 > pD,31 the relevant equilibrium
condition is
~p = PD   pD  pD () PD  2pD () 
2 (VM   2VD)  s:
Conversely, whenever such an equilibrium exists, the most protable of these
equilibria, which is thus a coalition-proof equilibrium,32 is such that the in-
cumbents charge min f~p; PE; 2pEg.
To study the existence of such an equilibrium, we note that:
~p >
PE
2
() 2 (VM   2VD) <   (S   s)() ~p > pE () PE
2
> pE:
Therefore:
31 ~p = PD   pD  pD amounts to PD  2pD; as PE > PD, this implies PE > 2pD.
32Recall that the alternative equilibrium, in which an incumbent wins both markets,
bring zero continuation values.
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 If 2 (VM   2VD)    (S   s), then pE  min f~p; PE=2g; incumbents
thus win their markets at price pE and obtain VD = S.
 If 2 (VM   2VD) >   (S   s), then ~p < min fpE; PE=2g; incumbents
thus win their markets at price ~p and obtain VD = s  2 (VM   2VD).
As the outcome of stateM depends on the comparison between 2 (2VD   VM)
and  S, we can therefore distinguish three congurations, depending on
where 2 (2VD   VM) lies, compared with the thresholds   (S   s) and  S.
We consider each case in turn.
A.3.1 Equilibrium conguration 1: 2 (VM   2VD)   S
From the above analysis, we then have VM = VD = S, and thus 
2 (VM   2VD) =
 2S >  S, a contradiction.
A.3.2 Equilibrium conguration 2:  S < 2 (VM   2VD)    (S   s)
From the above analysis, we then have
VM = S + s+ S   s+ 2 (VM   2VD) = 2S + 2 (VM   2VD)
and VD = S, leading to
VM   2VD = 2 (VM   2VD) :
We thus have:
2 (VM   2VD) = 0 >   (S   s) ;
a contradiction.
A.3.3 Equilibrium conguration 3:   (S   s) < 2 (VM   2VD)  s
In state D, each incumbent keeps its market at price ~p and obtains
VD = s  2 (VM   2VD) :
In stateM, M obtains both markets at price PE and obtains
VM = S + s:
We thus have:
VM   2VD = S + s  2
 
s  2 (VM   2VD)

= S   s+ 22 (VM   2VD) ;
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leading to:
VM   2VD = S   s
1  22 :
The required conditions thus amount to:
  (S   s)  2 (VM   2VD) = 
2
1  22 (S   s)  s:
The rst condition requires 2 < 1=2,33 and the second condition then
amounts to:  
1  22 s  2 (S   s), s
S
 Sync () = 
2
1  2 :
Given that s < S, this condition implies 2 < 1=2. Therefore, if s=S 
Sync (), there exists a (symmetric) Markov perfect equilibrium in which:
(i) in state M, M wins both markets at price PE; and (ii) in state D, the
two incumbents keep their respective markets at price ~p and obtain
VD =
s  2 (S + s)
1  22  0;
where the inequality is strict when s=S > Sync ().
A.4 Synchronous tenders: recap
Summing-up, we have:
 If s=S > Sync (), there exists a unique coalition-proof, symmetric
Markov perfect equilibrium which is a dual-state equilibrium:
 in stateM, M wins both markets at price PE and obtains VM =
2S;
 in state D, the two incumbents keep their respective markets at
price ~p and obtain
VD =
s  2 (S + s)
1  22 > 0:
The equilibrium path depends on the initial state:
33If 2 > 1=2, then 2 < 1 implies 2=
 
1  22 <  1.
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 starting from stateM in period 0, the equilibrium path remains
in the monopoly state and the per market equilibrium price is:
pM  PE
2
=
 
1  2 S + s
2
;
 starting instead from state D in period 0, the equilibrium path
remains in the duopoly state and the equilibrium market price is
lower (as VM > 2VD) and equal to:
pD  ~p =
 
1  2 s  2 (S + s)
1  22 :
 If instead s=S < Sync (), there exists a unique Markov perfect equilib-
rium which is a single-state equilibrium: regardless of the initial state,
from period 1 onwards the equilibrium path stays in the monopoly
state, and yields the same outcome as above, namely, M wins both
markets at price PE and obtains VM = 2S; the equilibrium per market
price is thus again equal to:
pM =
 
1  2 S + s
2
:
 Finally, in the limit case s=S = Sync (), both of the above equilibria
constitute coalition-proof, symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium; they
moreover yield the same equilibrium prices and prots: this is obvious
in the monopoly state, as both equilibria yield pM =
 
1  2S and
VM = S, but it also holds in the duopoly state, where it is straight-
forward to check that both equilibria yield zero price and continuation
values when s=S = Sync ().
B Proof of Proposition 7
We rst check that the monopoly price is higher under staggered tendering:
 If   Stag (s=S), then:
pStagM  pSyncM = (1  ) [(1 + )S + s] 
 
1  2 S + s
2
= (1  ) S   s+  (S + s)
2
> 0:
 If instead  < Stag (s=S), then:
pStagM  pSyncM =
1  
1  2
 
1     2S   2s  1  2 S + s
2
=
(1  )2
2
S   s
1  2 > 0:
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 By contrast, the duopoly prices are higher under synchronous tender-
ing:
pSyncD   pStagD =
 
1  2 s  2 (S + s)
1  22  
1  2
1  2 [(1  ) s  S]
=  (1  )  1  2 S   s
(1  2)  1  22
> 0;
The conclusion then follows from the fact that, as already noted, pSyncM >
pSyncD .
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